In his Letter on Humanism, Heidegger asks: “Should we still keep the name “humanism” for a “humanism” that contradicts all previous humanism” (263)? This question is characteristic of Heidegger’s understanding of humanism by virtue of its radical departure from all pre-existing definitions of humanism—including Sartre’s. For Heidegger, traditional humanism is an attempt to liberate humans to allow them to become the best possible version of the beings they are. From Ancient Rome to Modern France, the basic tenet of humanism has remained the same. Specifically, every interpretation of humanism thus far has been metaphysical in the sense that it builds off an entity-oriented understanding of being and treats all beings, including human beings, as having some defining attribute or essence. Consequently, its philosophizing is confined by the realm of metaphysics. Heidegger rejects that humanism as he conceives it should be metaphysical at all: his project is humanistic only insofar as it still reserves a special place for human beings. In his view, humanism should reject all previous presuppositions and ask, instead, what it means to be.